Variable renewable energy and market design: new products and a real-world study by Algarvio, Hugo et al.
energies
Article
Variable Renewable Energy and Market Design:
New Products and a Real-World Study
Hugo Algarvio 1,2 , Fernando Lopes 1,* , António Couto 1 , Ana Estanqueiro 1 and
João Santana 2
1 LNEG–National Laboratory of Energy and Geology, Est. Paço Lumiar 22, 1649-038 Lisbon, Portugal;
hugo.algarvio@tecnico.ulisboa.pt (H.A.); antonio.couto@lneg.pt (A.C.); ana.estanqueiro@lneg.pt (A.E.)
2 Instituto Superior Técnico, 1049-001 Lisbon, Portugal; jsantana@ist.utl.pt
* Correspondence: fernando.lopes@lneg.pt; Tel.: +351-210-924-600
Received: 14 October 2019; Accepted: 27 November 2019; Published: 30 November 2019 
Abstract: Most existing energy markets (EMs) were not designed to take into account an active
participation of variable renewable energy (VRE). This situation results typically in imbalances and
substantial costs in balancing markets. Such costs are reflected both in the energy and the VRE
parts of the consumer tariffs. Both appropriate market products and new elements of market design
may largely facilitate the large-scale integration of VRE in EMs. Accordingly, this article presents
a new bilateral energy contract and introduces two new marketplaces that can contribute to reduce
the imbalances resulting from VRE producers. It also presents a study conducted with the help of
an agent-based tool, called MATREM. The results indicate a significant decrease in the imbalances
and the associated costs.
Keywords: day-ahead market; balancing market; bilateral trading; market design; variable renewable
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1. Introduction
Energy markets (EMs) are a complex and continuously evolving reality, meaning that new
players are emerging—chief among these are the producers of variable renewable energy (VRE)—and
new challenges need to be managed—such as the ones associated with the participation of VRE
producers in competitive markets [1,2]. Indeed, recent years have witnessed a substantial increase of
non-controllable or variable renewable energy, notably wind power and solar photovoltaic. VRE has
several unique characteristics compared to those of conventional generation, including significant fixed
capital costs but near-zero or zero production costs. VRE is also normally the marginal resource, since
it is operated at maximum capacity (taking into account the weather conditions). These characteristics
have a strong influence on the outcomes of EMs, reducing market-clearing prices [3]. Accordingly, the
research community has paid attention to the effectiveness of current market designs to determine if
they are still efficient to deal with the increasing levels of VRE (see, e.g., [4,5]).
VRE typically involves significant forecast errors, which may result in large imbalances.
The day-ahead market (DAM) closes normally at 12:00 p.m. (CET), and thus the bids of wind power
producers need to be calculated by taking into account power forecasts computed 12 to 36 h ahead.
As a result, an adjustment of the gate closure to a time closer to real-time operation seems to be
important to enable a fair participation of VRE producers. The differences between the quantities of
energy produced and the commitments resulting from the DAM need to be balanced in the intra-day
market and/or the balancing market. At present, the participation of VRE producers in balancing
markets (BMs) is still very limited, despite the technical feasibility and the (potential) motivation to
operationalize such participation.
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To address the issues associated with the participation of VRE producers in markets, adaptations to
the current market structure as well as new elements of market design have been proposed by theorists
and practitioners working on the area of competitive energy markets. For instance, the International
Energy Agency points out that the physical transactions of electrical energy in power systems with
high shares of VRE need to be made by considering auctions and centralized pools, and should not
take into account feed-in-tariffs or other supporting schemes. The process of trading energy also needs
to be improved by defining the terms of the transactions up to 30 min before real-time operation with
an interval up to 10 min [6]. This near real-time negotiation is also supported by the Clean Energy
Package (Article 7), published by the European Commission [7]. In this package, a new proposal for
regulating the Internal Market for Electricity is presented, with the main goals of stimulating the global
leadership of Europe in renewables, harmonizing markets rules, supporting the integration of VRE,
and increasing the general welfare of consumers (see [8] for a complete overview). Article 6 of the new
proposal indicates that market operators should develop new products to accommodate the increasing
levels of VRE and support demand-response programs.
Now, generally speaking, European markets typically allow bidding up to 5 to 30 min before
real-time operation, contributing to reduce the imbalances resulting from VRE producers. The markets
of North-America and Australia present some additional flexibility by including 5-min real-time
(sub-)markets. Despite this, most real-world markets operate by considering power (MW) and not
energy (MWh), thus allowing to some extent substantial deviations of VRE producers.
Against this background, this article presents a new bilateral energy contract, called short-term
energy (STE) contract, and introduces two new marketplaces that may allow to reduce the imbalances
resulting from VRE producers (we note that throughout the article the terms “new marketplace”
and “new market product” will be used interchangeably). The main aim is to enable an active
and competitive participation of VRE producers in energy markets, decreasing imbalances and the
associated costs, and to some extent avoiding the waste of energy. The new contract and the design of
the new marketplaces take into account the following aspects: legal basis, market time unit, minimum
bid quantity, transaction time horizon, type of market participant, and the role of participants in
the process of trading energy. The authors are aware of no similar market products in place in the
real-world.
Furthermore, the article presents a simulation-based study to analyze the behavior (and test) the
new contract and the design of the new market places in a real-world setting. The study involves
the participation of both wind power producers (WPPs) and retailers in markets, who prepare bids
according to different strategies. The simulations are performed with the help of the agent-based tool
called MATREM (see [9,10]). Six key performance indicators (KPIs) are considered, namely the value
of wind energy to the market, the global imbalances of the system, the imbalances and costs of WPPs
and retailers, and the total cost of the system.
The work presented here builds on our previous work in the areas of trading wind power in
markets [11,12] and portfolio optimization of retailers [13]. Specifically, in [11], we investigated the
benefits of the participation of WPPs in BMs at both economic and technical levels. In [12], we analyzed
the impact of the wind power forecast uncertainty and the change of the day-ahead market gate closure
on market outcomes. In [13], we introduced a model for optimizing the portfolios of retailers using the
Markowitz theory. In this paper, as noted, we present and test a contract and two marketplaces related
to the participation of VRE producers in energy markets.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the main features of
existing energy markets. Section 3 discusses the participation of VRE producers in balancing markets.
Section 4 presents the new energy contract and Section 5 the new marketplaces. Section 6 summarizes
the features of the MATREM system. Section 7 illustrates the trading behavior of WPPs by taking
into account the new contract and marketplaces. Section 8 presents the simulation-based study and
discusses the experimental results. Finally, Section 9 presents some concluding remarks.
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2. Energy Markets and VRE Producers
Day-ahead markets close typically at 12:00 p.m., 12 to 36 h before physical delivery. Market
participants trade energy on exchanges or pools using programs based on the system marginal pricing
theory. Prices and quantities are calculated in a specific day D for every hour of day D+ 1. Intra-day
markets are essentially markets involving scheduling and pricing procedures a few hours ahead to
facilitate balancing in advance of real-time. Such markets may involve various sessions based on
auctions or may operate continuously (see, e.g., [14]). Most American markets also include a short
term market, generally referred to a real-time market, to set prices and schedules for 5-min periods
(but see [3]).
Derivatives are financial instruments that include forwards, futures, options and swaps [15].
These instruments are essentially contracts to buy or sell a specific amount of electricity at a certain
future time for a specific price. They may span from days to several years and allow market participants
to hedge against the financial risk inherent to day-ahead and intra-day prices [16]. Also, they may be
financial (involving a purely financial settlement) or physical (involving a financial settlement and
the physical delivery of energy), and are typically traded in derivatives exchanges. In short, market
participants submit orders to sell or buy electricity in an electronic trading platform. Orders include the
quantity and the price as well as several other parameters that are deemed appropriate. The trading
platform automatically and continuously matches the orders that are likely to interfere with each other
(typically, for a particular type of contract and a specific energy price). Also, apart from derivatives
exchanges, bilateral contracts—such as forwards and swaps—may be negotiated privately between
two parties. The terms of such contracts are very flexible and can be defined to meet the objectives and
needs of both parties (but see [17] for a more in-depth discussion).
Balancing markets are imposed by the European Network of transmission system operators and
allow to compensate the deviations from the schedules defined in day-ahead and intra-day markets,
as well as in bilateral contracts. The players that deviate typically need to pay penalties. The system
operators have access to reserve capacity for the provision of system services, namely primary reserve
(or frequency control reserve), secondary reserve (or fast active disturbance reserve), and tertiary
reserve (or slow active disturbance reserve). Primary reserve is the first to be activated, after grid
disturbances or imbalances between production and consumption. It must be activated up to 15 s and
the disturbances need to be controlled in 30 s. Secondary reserve should be fully activated in 30 s and
can continue active for a maximum of 15 min. Tertiary reserve is activated manually, up to 15 min, and
can continue active for hours (see, e.g., [8]).
Secondary and tertiary reserve are traded by system operators in day-ahead tenders. In short,
these agents define the needs of the power system for up and down-regulation, receive the proposals
of the authorized participants, and determine schedules and prices by using an algorithm based on
the system marginal pricing theory. Typically, different simulations are performed for computing the
price for up and down-regulation. Now, apart from bilateral contracts and derivatives exchanges,
balancing markets are most important for the work described here, and the next section is devoted to
the participation of VRE producers in such markets.
3. Participation of VRE Producers in Balancing Markets
3.1. Status of some European Countries and Product Analysis
Considering the technical feasibility of the participation of wind power producers in balancing
markets, several authors acknowledge this possibility, in case the current market rules and product
specifications are adapted (see, e.g., [18–20]). In this way, and although with some restrictions,
notably the fact that WPPs need to prepare bids aggregated with conventional generation, Spain [18],
Germany [19] and Denmark [20] have already allowed the participation of WPPs in BMs (although for
downward regulation only).
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Great Britain allowed WPPs to participate in two curtailment products, namely “manage
constraint” and “rebalance system”, receiving 40% more money to curtail energy than to produce it,
which is often not considered an efficient way to use VRE (but see [21]). In Belgium, some researchers
studied the participation of WPPs in BMs, considering the downward automatic-activated frequency
restoration reserve (aFRR), obtaining a reliability higher than 90% (see [22]). And for the case of EU-28,
a study considering the participation of WPPs, solar producers and other renewable energy producers
in BMs, indicated a reduction of 6% in the costs associated with such markets [23].
Now, considering existing and emerging market products associated with VRE producers and
BMs, the provision of reactive power may be considered an important product [24]. Also, primary
reserve is a potential product for VRE producers, contributing to compensate the disadvantage of
a reduced inertia in power systems with high levels of VRE [25]. Photovoltaic systems do not have
mass inertia and can adjust their output within milliseconds. Wind turbines can deliver primary
reserve faster than is currently required. Also, wind turbines can deliver synthetic inertia, which
can solve the problem of the reduced inertia of the grid due to high shares of VRE [26]. In this way,
the well-known ramping products [27] and the P2X solutions [28] are important aspects to explore. We
note, however, that fast ramping schedules in frequency control ancillary services (FCAS) can avoid
the curtailment of VRE, although some limitations prevent an adequate participation of VRE producers
(e.g., fixed sloping schedules). Also, the prices associated with power to X solutions (P2X), such as
power-to-hydrogen, are currently very low.
All of the mentioned “products”share a common shortcoming: they contribute to an increase of
the waste of energy or curtailment of VRE, by making VRE producers participating in non-optimal
schedules. Furthermore, all of them consider the technical capabilities of VRE, instead of the optimal
use of VRE without curtailments, wasting energy and allowing a large (short-term) interaction between
market participants, notably VRE producers, retailers and transmission system operators (TSOs).
3.2. Bid Preparation and Energy Deviations
The participation of VRE producers in balancing markets involves the preparation and submission
of bids, typically for a period of one hour, creating large difficulties for producers to keep a stable and
efficient operation without curtailments or deviations. Specifically, WPPs need to bid their expected
active power, Pbid(T), in day-ahead and intra-day markets, based on forecasts that use time horizons
between 18 h and 42 h (for DAMs), and between 2 h and 7 h (for intra-day markets), ahead of real-time
operation. At real-time, considering the data obtained from wind parks, there is the possibility to
compute the average production, Pavg(T), for a particular period of time T.
From the point of view of the grid, WPPs produce instantaneous power, p(t), based on the wind
speed, the characteristics and power of wind turbines and the configuration of wind parks. The energy,
E(T), produced during a period of time T, is computed as follows:
E(T) =
∫ T
0
p(t)dt = T × Pavg. (1)
The deviation, Edev(T), in period T is given by the following formula:
Edev(T) = T × Pavg − T × Pbid = T(Pavg − Pbid). (2)
Figure 1 illustrates the relation between these variables for a particular hour of operation (T = 1).
It shows the traded/scheduled power, Pbid(T), of a particular wind power producer in the day-ahead
market (red curve). The corresponding energy, Ebid(T), is represented by the orange area. The real
production of the wind power producer is given by p(t) (solid blue curve). The difference between
the instantaneous power and the scheduled power gives the energy deviation, Edev(T), which is
represented by the light blue area.
Energies 2019, 12, 4576 5 of 17
Figure 1. Bids of wind power producers and the associated deviations.
Considering now that wind power producers are allowed to make only single bids in the balancing
market (i.e., bids without considering aggregation of WPPs), the maximum expected power that they
can submit, PBMbid(T), is defined by the difference between the minimum instantaneous deviation
and the traded power:
PBMbid(T) = (−1)c × (min (|p(t)|)− Pbid(T)) (3)
where t = 1, . . . , 60, and the bid is of the type upward regulation, i.e., c = 0 (for a downward regulation
bid, consider the maximum instead of the minimum, and c = 1).
Figure 1 shows that the submission of PBMbid(T) to the balancing market, and its subsequent
acceptance by the system operator, results in a waste of energy (the difference between the dashed and
solid blue curves). For the particular case of the secondary reserve market, the waste of energy may
be even larger than that. Accordingly, existing products associated with the balancing market may
not be considered adequate to deal with the variability and uncertainty of VRE. A possible solution
to overcome the problem is to consider aggregated bids involving VRE producers and conventional
generation. However, not all power systems allow aggregated bids, specially for the case of BMs.
4. The Short-Term Energy Contract
The short-term energy (STE) contract is a new type of bilateral contract—and to some extent
a new market product—that presents some similarities with the aforementioned bilateral contracts,
although there are obvious differences. The specifications of the contract are shown in Table 1. It has
the goal of allowing agents to reduce/avoid imbalances and consequently the potential payment of
penalties—that is, it is not a profit-seeking product. Accordingly, the energy price is pre-defined as the
market-clearing price (DAM price) for the period under consideration. The minimal energy quantity is
0.1 MWh. Agents submit to a trading platform bids involving specific energy quantities for periods
of 15 min (and not one hour). Bids may be new or associated with energy deviations and should be
submitted up to one hour prior to real-time operation. Buy and sell bids likely to interfere with each
other generate transactions and new contracts. To this end, the trading platform takes into account
energy quantities only (quantities may be either fully or partially matched). Bids associated with
deviations have priority over new bids and are matched according to a principle of equity. Physical
delivery is done in strict accordance with transmission system operators, who are informed about the
terms and conditions of new contracts (energy price, energy quantity, etc.).
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Table 1. Main specifications of the short-term energy contract.
Characteristic Details
Trading
procedure/period Auction/year-round
Time unit 15 min (of each day)
Description Electronic trading managed by exchanges; agents offer their energy deviationsin exchanges, informing TSOs of deals
Match type Full or partial
Key feature Different contracts for positive and negative energy
Bid submission Till 1 h prior to the balancing period
Key bid elements Energy quantity, match type, etc.
Energy quantity Minimum of 0.1 MWh; traded quantity based on an equity principle
Type of bid Bid associated with an energy deviation or a new bid; deviations have priorityover new bids
Payment scheme Day-ahead price
Participants VRE producers, conventional generation producers, retailers
Now, an important feature—and to the best of our knowledge—a novel feature of the STE contract
is the inherent aspect of considering energy and not power. Figure 2 illustrates this aspect by depicting
bids involving either power (green line) or energy (blue line). Bids are assumed to be simple and consist
of quantities and other parameters that are deemed appropriate (e.g., match type). The settlement
period has the duration of 15 min. Existing bilateral contracts consider typically a quantity based on
power, meaning that power plants should follow a constant production schedule during the settlement
period (green line of Figure 2, corresponding to a quantity of 50 MW). This may not be adequate for
wind power producers and other VRE producers due to the uncertainty and variability of renewable
generation. Accordingly, the SET contract considers a quantity based on energy—that is, power plants
do not necessarily need to follow a constant production schedule during the settlement period (orange
line of Figure 2, corresponding to an average quantity of 12.5 MWh). This typically leads to a decrease
of the imbalances and the associated costs (but see the real-world study presented in Section 8). Overall,
despite the existence of a number of contracts traded in energy markets worldwide, such as daily
future contracts or even 15-min base and peak contracts (see, e.g., [29,30]), it is especially noteworthy
that we are aware of no contracts similar to the short-term energy contract. At this stage, we note that
an appealing alternative to the short-term energy contract involves the submission of both energy price
and energy quantity (instead of energy quantity only). However, energy would be traded at different
prices and, to some extent, some transactions would not be considered due to the mismatch of price.
Figure 2. Real production of a hypothetical variable renewable energy (VRE) producer (orange line)
and bids of power (green line) and energy (blue line) for a settlement period of 15 min.
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Table 2. Important features of the renewable power band marketplace.
Characteristic Details
Trading procedure/period Auction/year-round
Market time unit 15 min (of each day)
Description
VRE producers use their frequency control capacity at balancing markets
by offering a power band that can help system operators solving
demand-supply imbalances
Key feature Power interval
Bid submission Till 15 min prior to the balancing period
Key bid elements Positive and negative power
Bid quantity Minimum of 0.1 MW; Power interval
Payment scheme Selected producers receive the secondary reserve price
Participants VRE producers
5. Trading Reserve Capacity
5.1. Renewable Power Band Marketplace
As noted earlier, the work published in [11] analysed the benefits of the participation of wind
power producers in balancing markets at both economic and technical levels. We found that a reduction
of the market time unit from 1 h to 15 min is beneficial to WPPs. Accordingly, this section considers
a market time unit of 15 min—that is, WPPs submit bids for periods of 15 min, and not for periods
of 1 h. In other words, capacity reserve is traded for 15-min periods. To this end, we also consider
that VRE producers participate in this marketplace by using the frequency control capacity, offering
a power band for each 15-min period, and thus participating with scarce real-time instantaneous
power. The upper limit should be lower than the expected optimal power, and the lower limit
should be higher than the technical capacity of VRE producers to reduce generation from an optimal
(or intermediary) level to a lower one. Also, bids may involve either positive or negative power
intervals and not necessarily intervals ranging from negative to positive values, as typically happens
in existing secondary reserve markets. Market participants are allowed to submit bids till 15 min prior
to real-time operation. They are remunerated by the secondary reserve price. Table 2 presents some
important features of this marketplace. Figure 3 illustrates the trading behavior of VRE producers,
by showing the different bids and the associated deviations, for a period of one hour.
Figure 3. Bids associated with an hypothetical VRE producer for a period of one hour (four periods of
15 min).
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Figure 3 is, to some extent, similar to Figure 1, which shows the traded/scheduled power, Pbid(T),
the corresponding energy, Ebid(T), the real production of a wind power producer, p(t), and the
energy deviation, Edev(T). In addition, Figure 3 also shows the lack of deviations resulting from the
participation in this marketplace—that is, the deviations that are avoided by WPPs—represented by
the green area (see also Section 8).
VRE producers should guarantee that they are able to comply with their bids (in order to avoid
the payment of penalties). Accordingly, for each 15-min period, the maximum power that they can bid,
PRPBbid, is given by the difference between the minimum deviation and the traded bid (see Equation (3)).
The wasted energy associated with the accepted bids is equal to the area between the solid blue curve
and the dashed green curve (see Figure 3).
5.2. Energy Reserve Marketplace
Again, as indicated in the previous subsection, the market time unit is assumed to be 15 min—that
is, VRE producers submit bids for periods of 15 min. Specifically, WPPs offer their energy (MWh) at
a near-zero price—that is, bids involve energy, instead of power—and the other market participants
typically submit bids at higher prices. All bids are ranked with increasing price (merit-order).
The transmission system operator, a non-commercial organization, independent of commercial players,
constitutes the demand side. In case this agent is procuring up regulation, the up-regulation bids with
lowest prices are activated until the procured quantity is reached. The price of the last up-regulated
quantity sets the up-regulation price. The bids with prices below the up-regulation price have a profit,
equal to the difference between the final regulation price and the offered price. A similar procedure is
used to find the down-regulation price. Players are allowed to submit bids till 15 min prior to real-time
operation. They are remunerated by the market-clearing price (tertiary reserve price). Table 3 presents
some important features of this marketplace.
Table 3. Important features of the energy reserve marketplace.
Characteristic Details
Trading procedure/period Auction/year-round
Market time unit 15 min (of each day)
Description VRE producers submit their deviations to balancing markets and informthe system operators of the magnitude of errors
Key feature Different products for positive and negative reserve
Bid submission Till 15 min prior to the balancing period
Key bid element Energy
Energy quantity Minimum of 0.1 MWh
Energy price Near-zero price
Payment scheme Selected producers receive the tertiary reserve price
Participants VRE producers
Overall, VRE producers submit their deviations (MWh) to this marketplace and inform TSOs
of the magnitude of the errors, thus avoiding to some extent the payment of large penalties (but see
Section 8). It is worth noting that to increase competition in the market VRE producers may submit
bids including a higher price (i.e., a price higher than a near-zero price). Specifically, for up-regulation,
the price may be equal to the price of the first ranked offer (minimal price). For down-regulation,
the price could be defined in a similar way (i.e., the price of the first ranked offer, or maximal price).
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6. Main Features of the MATREM System
MATREM (for Multi-Agent TRading in Electricity Markets) is an agent-based tool for simulating
the behavior of competitive energy markets. In [9], we present a detailed description of the system,
and in [10] we classify the system according to a number of dimensions associated with both electricity
markets and intelligent agents. The remainder of this section gives an overview of MATREM.
The system supports a day-ahead market (DAM), an intra-day market (IDM), a futures market,
and a balancing market (BM). The DAM is a central market where generation and demand are traded
on an hourly basis [31]. The IDM is a short-term market that involves several auction sessions.
Both markets operate according to the marginal pricing theory and are controlled by a market operator
agent. Two pricing mechanisms are supported: system marginal pricing (SMP) and locational marginal
pricing (LMP). The futures market is a market to hedge against the financial risk (i.e., the price
volatility) associated with the DAM and the IDM. It is an organized market for both financial and
physical products, which may span from days to years. The balancing market is a market for the
provision of system services. MATREM considers three types of reserve, namely primary reserve,
secondary reserve and tertiary reserve. The stability of the power system is a task associated with
a system operator agent, who is responsible for the operation of this market.
The system also supports a marketplace for negotiating tailored (or customized) bilateral
contracts, notably contracts defined to cover the delivery of large amounts of electrical energy over
long periods of time. Two types of contracts are considered: forward contracts and contracts for
difference [32]. The negotiating parties are equipped with a model that handles two-party and
multi-issue negotiation. The negotiation process is an iterative process involving an exchange of offers
and counter-offers [33–35].
Market participants are modeled as software agents and include generating companies, retailers,
aggregators, traditional consumers, coalitions of consumers, market operators and system operators.
VRE aggregators allow the participation of WPPs and other VRE producers in the aforementioned
markets. Coalitions of consumers are essentially alliances of end-use customers with the main goal of
increasing their bargaining power. The system platform is a 32/64-bit computer running the JAVA
programming language and the JADE platform [36].
7. Trading Behavior of Wind Power Producers
As noted earlier, most existing energy markets, including the Iberian electricity market [37],
were not designed to deal with large levels of non-dispatchable generation. MIBEL includes
a day-ahead market and an intra-day market, managed by the Spanish electricity market operator
(OMIE [38]), as well as a derivatives market, managed by the Portuguese electricity market operator
(OMIP [39]). Market participants submit hourly bids to trade energy in the day-ahead market. The IDM
involves six auction sessions, with gate-closures between 1 and 5 h ahead of real-time operation.
The derivatives market allows private parties to trade standardized bilateral contracts.
Figure 4 shows the typical trading behavior of WPPs in the DAM and the IDM, which takes into
consideration the most reliable meteorological data, in order to minimize deviations. WPPs submit
wind power forecasts in the day-ahead market during day D−1, and make commitments to produce
specific quantities of energy for day D. The bids to submit to the intra-day market are essentially
deviations—that is, they are computed by taking into consideration the actual commitments and the
current updates of the wind power forecasts.
In this work, the forecasts are obtained by considering the Neural Network Toolbox and the
artificial neuronal networks (ANN) approach [40]. ANN is typically organized in layers, namely the
input, hidden, and output layers. Each layer covers one or more nodes that represent the basic unit of
information process (also known as the neuron). The main advantage of the ANN is the capability to
deal with nonlinear relationships by learning the association between the predictors and predictions.
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Figure 4. Trading behavior of wind power producers in the day-ahead and intra-day markets.
Numerical weather prediction (NWP) models present systematic errors, which are mainly
associated with the following: (i) initial and boundary meteorological conditions (ICs), (ii) a poor
representation of the physics of the models, and (iii) a failure to solve sub-grid scale phenomena,
such as the sea-land interaction. The data to feed the NWP model to enable wind power producers to
participate in the day-ahead market are based on ICs from 06:00 UTC, representing a time horizon for
the meteorological forecast ranging between 18 to 42 h ahead. For the case of the intra-day market,
the time horizon for the forecast ranges from 2 to 7 h (depending on the auction session).
The meteorological data (ICs) are updated every six hours, namely at 6:00, 12:00, 18:00 and
24:00 (see the small light-blue arrows of Figure 4). This data needs to be processed to get the wind
power forecasts, involving a computation time of nearly 2 h (see the dotted green lines of Figure 4).
The updated forecasts are represented by the vertical orange arrows, meaning that the bids of WPPs
to intra-day sessions 1, 3, 5 and 6 are based on updated data, and the bids to the other sessions take
into account the available data only. Also, the bids of WPPs for a particular intra-day session involve
the first hours of that session only—that is, the hours until the beginning of the next session (see the
horizontal dark yellow arrows of Figure 4). Such bids include a quantity and a price. The quantity
refers to the excess of energy. The price is 0 e/MWh.
Overall, WPPs submit bids to the day-ahead market, make commitments to produce energy during
day D, and submit their deviations to the various sessions of the intra-day market. After that, in case
WPPs still expect deviations, they can make use of the new bilateral energy contract to eventually
reduce the imbalances. Following this, WPPs can participate in the aforementioned marketplaces.
At the end, in case WPPs still expect deviations, they need to assume their balance responsibility and
(eventually) pay penalties for their imbalances.
8. Simulation-Based Study
This section presents a simulation-based study carried out by using the MATREM system.
It involves the simulation of the day-ahead and intra-day markets, as well as the use of the new
contract and the simulation of the new marketplaces.
8.1. Data, Agents and Scenarios
The following sources of data are considered: (i) hourly prices and quantities of the day-ahead
and intra-day Iberian markets (data published by the Spanish electricity market operator, OMIE [38]),
(ii) hourly prices and quantities submitted to the Portuguese balancing market (data reported by
the Portuguese system operator, REN [41]), and (iii) hourly deviations and prices of the imbalances
for producers and retailers (data reported by REN [41]). Also, the study makes use of real wind
power data from a set of wind parks located in the central region of Portugal, which is available from
1 January 2009 to 31 December 2010.
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The (software) agents are 12 producers (with several production units), representing the
supply-side of Portugal, five retailers, representing the demand-side of Portugal and Spain,
and one aggregated wind power producer, with 249 MW of installed capacity (representing 10%
of the Portuguese installed capacity in 2010). To get expressive results, the data was upscaled to
2490 MW of installed capacity, by multiplying all values by a constant factor.
Table 4 presents several key features of the producer agents. As noted earlier, the forecasts for the
day-ahead and intra-day markets (time horizon ranging from 18 h to 42 h, in case of the day-ahead
market, and from 2 to 7 h, for the intra-day market), were obtained by considering a numerical weather
prediction model coupled with an artificial neuronal networks approach. Both the numerical prediction
model and the artificial neuronal approach were calibrated for the region under consideration.
The normalized root mean square error of the day-ahead forecast is around 13.5%. For the new products,
the wind power forecasts were obtained using the historical time series and the ANN approach.
Table 4. Key features of the producer agents.
Agent
Identifier
Iberian
Country
Generation
Technology
Maximum
Capacity (MW)
Marginal Cost
(e/MWh)
P1 Portugal Wind 2500 0
P2 Portugal Renewable mix 2000 0
P3 Portugal Hydro 4500 [30, 60]
P4 Portugal Coal 1800 ≈30
P5 Portugal Gas Combined Cycle 3000 ≈55
P6 Portugal Fuel oil 2000 ≈70
P7 Spain Renewable mix 30,000 0
P8 Spain Hydro 16,500 [30, 60]
P9 Spain Coal 10,000 ≈30
P10 Spain Nuclear 7500 ≈30
P11 Spain Gas Combined Cycle 22,000 ≈55
P12 Spain Fuel oil 4000 ≈70
The study involves the following seven scenarios:
• S1: Wind power producers participate in the day-ahead market only (baseline scenario);
• S2: WPPs participate in both the day-ahead and the intra-day markets;
• S3: WPPs participate in the DAM and the IDM, and make use of the STE contract; also, retailers and
conventional generation participate in the DAM and the IDM, and make use of the STE contract;
• S4: WPPs participate in the day-ahead and intra-day markets, as well in the energy
reserve marketplace;
• S5: WPPs participate in the DAM and the IDM, as well in the renewable power band marketplace;
• S6: WPPs participate in the DAM, the IDM, and the renewable power band and energy
reserve marketplaces;
• S7: WPPs participate in the DAM, the IDM, use the STE contract, and participate in the renewable
power band and energy reserve marketplaces; also, retailers and conventional generation
participate in the DAM and the IDM, and use the STE contract.
For all scenarios, we consider that the agents assume their balance responsibility, including the
wind power producers, meaning that all agents pay penalties for their imbalances. To quantify the
relevance of both the new contract and the new marketplaces, several important parameters are
simulated, notably:
• Deviations of wind power producers and retailers;
• Deviation costs of wind power producers and retailers;
• Wind energy value to the market.
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8.2. Results and Discussion
Tables 5 and 6, and Figures 5 and 6 summarize the results obtained by simulating the behavior of
the day-ahead and intra-day markets with the help of the MATREM system, as well as considering the
new contract and the new marketplaces. In particular, Table 5 shows the main results for the wind
power producers, namely the energy value, the deviations and the remunerations. The table indicates
that the STE contract (scenario S3) substantially reduced the deviations of the wind power producers,
namely 56% in relation to the base scenario (see also Figure 5). In this way, the use of this contract
decreased the cost of the deviations of WPPs by nearly 59% (see also Figure 6). However, WPPs were
remunerated by the day-ahead clearing price, which was normally less attractive than the price of the
tertiary reserve market (mFRR market). The participation of WPPs in the energy reserve marketplace
(scenario S4) also increased the wind energy value (16% in relation to the base scenario S1). This result
is explained by the high remuneration received by WPPs in the mFRR market, for their excess of energy
(according to the actual operation of the Iberian market). In relation to the participation of WPPs in
the renewable power band marketplace (scenario S5), they obtained a high levelized remuneration
from energy. However, in comparison with the other scenarios, WPPs trade a lower quantity of energy,
which results in a lower remuneration, and a higher cost with deviations.
Table 5. Simulation results for the wind power producers (energy value, deviations and remunerations).
Scenario Energy Value(e/MWh)
Deviation
(MW/h)
Deviation
Cost (ke/h)
Remuneration
(Energy)
(e/MWh)
Remuneration
(Power)
(e/MW)
Liquid Profit
(e/MWh)
S1 28.05 281.53 4.54 — — —
S2 29.51 210.05 3.13 — — —
S3 31.29 123.10 1.83 −15.00 — 14.99
S4 32.58 148.61 2.00 −7.14 — 36.48
S5 31.57 195.83 2.89 64.26 29.06 25.07
S6 34.31 142.00 1.88 −2.50 29.06 34.61
S7 33.25 98.66 1.40 −11.52 28.83 18.74
Table 6. Simulation results for the retailer agents.
Scenario Deviation(MW/h)
Deviation
Cost (ke/h)
Remuneration
(Energy) (e/MWh)
Liquid Profit
(e/MWh)
S1 — — — —
S2 431.91 6.07 — —
S3 262.67 3.75 18.14 5.24
S4 — — — —
S5 — — — —
S6 — — — —
S7 262.67 3.75 18.14 5.24
Table 5 indicates that the use of the STE contract and the participation of WPPs in the energy
reserve marketplace (scenarios S3 and S4) are particularly important, compensating their real-time
lack of energy (i.e., wind power forecast underestimations). An analysis of the fifth column of the table
shows that WPPs need to buy energy to fulfill their commitments with the DAM and the IDM. For the
case of scenario S5, involving the participation of WPPs in the renewable power band marketplace,
the benefits are not substantial for situations involving wind power forecast underestimations. In such
situations, WPPs receive money for their excess of energy, instead of paying for their lack of energy.
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Figure 5. Simulation results (reduction of deviations of the wind power producers).
Figure 6. Simulation results (reduction of deviation cost of wind power producers).
The sixth column of the table reflects to some extent the price of the secondary reserve market
(aFRR market). WPPs receive a higher remuneration for power (scenario S5, corresponding to
29.06 e/MW), in comparison with the remuneration resulting from scenario S7 (28.83 e/MW),
involving the new contract and the participation in the new marketplaces. This result is associated
with a reduction in deviations that is not attractive, leading to a reduced power band (and bid).
Overall, the results of Table 5 show that the use of the new market products are beneficial to wind
power producers. Accordingly, both market operators and independent system operators should take
them into consideration, possibly with particular adaptations and/or extensions, in order to allow
an effective participation of VRE producers in liberalized markets—that is, to provide the flexibility
needed to integrate the increasing levels of renewable generation, maintaining the security of the
power systems.
Table 6 shows the simulation results for the particular case of retailers. These agents use the STE
contract only. The results indicate that the retailer agents reduce the deviations in 39% and the costs
with deviations in 38%. Also, the results for scenario S7 show that the use of the STE contract and the
participation in the new marketplaces by WPPs, as well as the use of the new contract by retailers,
result in a significant decrease in the global imbalances (−49%) and the associated costs (−51%).
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9. Conclusions
This article presented a new bilateral energy contract (STE contract) and new marketplaces
designed to allow wind power producers to (eventually) reduce their deviations. The contract and
the marketplaces were to some extent tested in a real-world study conducted with the help of the
multi-agent system MATREM.
The software agents were 12 producers, representing the supply-side of Portugal, five retailers,
representing the demand-side of Portugal and Spain, and one aggregated wind power producer.
The data involved hourly prices and quantities of the day-ahead and intra-day Iberian markets, hourly
prices and quantities submitted to the Portuguese balancing market, and hourly deviations and
prices of the imbalances for producers and retailers. Seven scenarios were considered, involving the
participation of wind power producers in the new marketplaces, and also using the new contract.
The simulation results indicated that the new contract and the new marketplaces are beneficial
to WPPs at both technical and economical levels, reducing the imbalances and increasing the wind
energy value to the market. Also, the STE contract led to a reduction in the imbalances of retailers,
resulting in a reduction of their costs with imbalances. Accordingly, market operators and system
operators should take into consideration the new products presented here, possibly with particular
adaptations and/or extensions, to allow an effective participation of VRE producers in liberalized
markets, thus contributing to a new paradigm involving no feed-in tariffs nor other supporting
schemes—that is, the paradigm expected in the near future, involving near 100% renewables.
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Abbreviations
aFRR Automatic-activated frequency restoration reserve
ANN Artificial neural networks
BM Balancing market
CG Conventional generation
CET Central European time
DAM Day-ahead market
EM Electricity market
EU-28 The European Union before Brexit
GFS Global Forecast System
IC Initial and boundary conditions
IDM Intra-day market
KPI Key performance indicator
LMP Locational marginal pricing
mFRR Manually-activated frequency restoration reserve
MATREM Multi-Agent TRading in Electricity Markets
MIBEL Iberian electricity market
NWP Numerical weather prediction
OMIE Spanish electricity market operator
OMIP Portuguese electricity market operator
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REN Portuguese TSO
STE Short-term energy contract
SMP System marginal pricing
UTC Coordinated universal time
VRE Variable renewable energy
TSO Transmission system operator
WPP Wind power producer
Indices
t Time (minutes)
T Time period (hour)
Parameters
Pnom Nominal capacity
Variables
c Parameter of Equation (3)
D Day
E(T) Energy
Ebid(T) Energy bid
Edev(T) Deviation
p(t) Instantaneous power
Pavg(T) Average power
Pbid(T) Power bid
PBMbid(T) Balancing market bid
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